Garland v. Herrin: Surviving Parents\u27 Remedies for a Child\u27s Wrongful Death - The Pecuniary-Loss Rule and Reckless Infliction of Emotional Distress by Miller, Kathleen Keogh
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Cleveland State Law Review Law Journals
1984
Garland v. Herrin: Surviving Parents' Remedies for
a Child's Wrongful Death - The Pecuniary-Loss
Rule and Reckless Infliction of Emotional Distress
Kathleen Keogh Miller
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Torts Commons
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cleveland
State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.
Recommended Citation
Note, Garland v. Herrin: Surviving Parents' Remedies for a Child's Wrongful Death - The Pecuniary-Loss Rule and Reckless Infliction
of Emotional Distress, 32 Clev. St. L. Rev. 641 (1983-1984)
GARLAND V. HERRIN: SURVIVING PARENTS' REMEDIES
FOR A CHILD'S WRONGFUL DEATH-THE PECUNIARY-
LOSS RULE AND RECKLESS INFLICTION OF
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
I. P ROLOGUE ............................................ 641
II. INTRODUCTION ......................................... 642
III. WRONGFUL DEATH AND PSYCHIC HARM ...................... 645
IV. INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS .......... 655
V. NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS ........... 659
A . Im p act .......................................... 660
B. Zone of Physical Danger .......................... 661
C. Zone of Psychic Danger-The General Negligence
M inority ......................................... 662
VI. INTENTIONAL ACTS CAUSING RECKLESS INFLICTION OF EMO-
TIONAL D ISTRESS ...................................... 664
VII. PSYCHIC HARM AND THE COURTS-SUMMARY .............. 676
V III. C ONCLUSION .......................................... 679
I. PROLOGUE
[T]he proper function of this Court is to ascertain what [the] law
is, and not to speculate about what it will be, or in Learned
Hand's felicitous phrase, "to embrace the exhilirating opportunity
of anticipating a doctrine which may be in the womb of time, but
whose birth is distant."1O n the basis that a federal court sitting in diversity must apply the
state law as it exists, on December 8, 1983, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the judgment of the district
court in the matter of Garland v. Herrin2 which had permitted the par-
ents of Bonnie Garland to recover damages for emotional distress reck-
lessly caused by the defendant's extreme and outrageous conduct of mur-
dering their daughter.3 The court held that the district court had erred by
allowing recovery where no state precedent supported the action.4
The appellate court did not attack the substance of the theory promul-
gated by the district court. While the law as proposed by the district
Garland v. Herrin, 724 F.2d 16, 17 (2d Cir. 1983) (citing Hausman v. Buckley, 299
F.2d 696, 704-05 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 885 (1962)).
554 F. Supp. 308 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 724 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1983).
3Id.
' 724 F.2d at 17.
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court may encompass a theory whose time has not yet come, the analysis
of the lower court is based on sound principles of tort law and should
portend the future recovery of a limited class of plaintiffs. The facts of
the Garland murder are important in providing a basis for analyzing the
anomalies and anachronisms in the law dealing with psychic harms, both
in the statutory wrongful-death action and in common-law tort actions.
II. INTRODUCTION
Bonnie Garland was fatally assaulted in her family home in the sum-
mer of 1977. The parents of Bonnie Garland became third-party victims
of their child's murder. A description of the murder is necessary to assess
the emotional injuries suffered by the parents as a result of the fatal at-
tack on their daughter.
Bonnie Garland and Richard Herrin met at Yale University in the fall
of 1974.1 Herrin was Bonnie Garland's suitor for the next three years. On
the night of July 6, 1977, while Herrin was a guest in the Garland home,
Richard and Bonnie had "an intense discussion of their future relation-
ship."' After Bonnie had fallen asleep, and while her parents slept in an-
other room in the house, Herrin went to the basement of the Garland
home, chose a hammer, wrapped it in a towel, and brought it back to
Bonnie's bedroom. Having ascertained that Bonnie was asleep, he pro-
ceeded to bludgeon her with repeated hammer blows to her skull.
7
After Richard left the blood-splattered room, he took the Garland's au-
tomobile and drove around the city contemplating his own death before
he ultimately surrendered himself to a priest.' At 8:00 a.m. that morning
Mrs. Garland answered her door to find several uniformed policemen in-
quiring as to her daughter's whereabouts.
Mrs. Garland rushed to her daughter's room and found a scene of
indescribable horror. She saw her daughter's hideously battered
' The murder of Bonnie Garland in the summer of 1977 provoked a great deal of pub-
licity. Bonnie Garland was described as a young vivacious woman at the threshold of life.
She was the daughter of an affluent New York attorney and was following in her father's
footsteps in attending his alma mater, Yale.
Richard Herrin, a poor Mexican-American, was valedictorian of his Los Angeles high
school class and was attending Yale on a full-tuition scholarship. Despite their different
backgrounds, Bonnie, a freshman, and Herrin, a junior, became attracted to one another in
the fall of 1974.
The murder itself did not take place at Yale, yet it became known in the media as the
"Yale Murder." For two different viewpoints on the murder and its aftermath, see
W. GAYLIN, THE KILLING OF BONNIE GARLAND (1982) (written from the perspective of a psy-
chiatrist); P. MEYER, THE YALE MURDER (1982) (written from the perspective of a
journalist).
" 554 F. Supp. 308, 311 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 724 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1983).
7 Id.
8 W. GAYLIN, supra note 5, at 99.
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body and the blood and brain matter, which had been splattered
about the room by the force of Herrin's hammer blows. Bonnie,
although in the most grievous condition, was still alive, gasping
for breath.9
Although Bonnie underwent surgery she died of the massive head injuries
later the same evening, with her parents in attendance.
The parents of Bonnie Garland, the third-party victims of this crime,
derived no satisfaction from the prosecution of their daughter's murderer.
Our criminal justice system rigorously protects the rights of the accused;
little or nothing is done for the accusor.'0 The prosecution for murder is
not instituted on behalf of the slain individual or the survivors; it is for a
public wrong and brought in the name of the state." The accused is con-
stitutionally protected during the criminal process. Furthermore, a skilled
defense attorney employing appropriate psychiatric evidence may succeed
in mitigating the offense by raising the insanity defense. 2
554 F. Supp. at 311-12.
,0 Carrington, Victim's Rights Litigation: A Wave of the Future?, 11 U. RICH. L. REv.
447, 448 (1977).
" Note, Compensating Victims of Crime: Evolving Concept or Dying Theory?, 82
W. VA. L. REV. 89, 95 (1979).
The one victim not heard from in either the criminal prosecution of Herrin or in the later
civil trial was Bonnie Garland.
Bonnie was never present at her own trial .... But, she was diminished, and, in
suggesting that she was somewhat responsible for her own fate, made an accom-
plice to her own killing. She was on trial, and was given no voice, no presence. No
real attempt was made by the prosecution to bring her to life.
W. GAYLIN, supra note 5, at 107.
When the victim is implicated in the trial of the murderer, the third-party victims suffer
further emotional trauma by their knowledge that the actual victim cannot take the stand in
his or her own defense. The third-party victim is forced to relive the heinous act of the
defendant and generally has no voice in the proceedings.
"2 At the criminal trial for the murder of Bonnie Garland, much psychiatric testimony
was introduced into evidence by the defense to explain and mitigate Herrin's "mental state"
at the time of the murder. The defense was centered around the sociological notion of "vic-
timization" by dramatizing Herrin's "underprivileged" childhood and his failure to assimi-
late at Yale.
The relationship between Bonnie Garland and Richard Herrin, which had lasted close to
three years, was a key factor in the defense of Richard Herrin. The relationship had been
intense. However, as Richard became ever more dependent upon Bonnie, Bonnie's interest
began to wane.
Just prior to the murder, Bonnie, a gifted singer, had been on a European tour with the
Yale Glee Club. Bonnie had always been a prolific correspondent with Richard during the
times they had been separated. As she was in her own way attempting to sever the bonds,
she quit corresponding. Richard grew more despondent and yet clung to the hope that the
relationship would remain the same.
When Bonnie returned from the tour, Richard immediately attempted to visit her. How-
ever, he was informed that she was being visited by another friend. His psychological depen-
dence on Bonnie and his total dependence on maintaining the relationship as the one stable
element in his life were used to explain the defendant's feelings that he could no longer cope
1983-84]
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The only remedy afforded to the third-party victim by a criminal pro-
ceeding is the catharsis brought about by the adjudication of the defen-
dant's guilt and appropriate sentencing."3 In the matter of Bonnie Gar-
land, there was no catharsis; the parents perceived that Herrin, having
been convicted of manslaughter rather than murder, literally "got away
with murder. ' "4 A minimum sentence of eight years did not expiate the
permanent loss of their child. The criminal justice system is not equipped
to alleviate the Garlands' injury arising from the loss of their daughter;
they and other third-party victims are left to seek recompense for their
harms through the civil system.
The harms suffered by the Garlands by the murder of their daughter
fall into two categories: tangible harms derivative of the wrongful death,
and intangible harms inflicted upon the psyches of the parents as a result
of the assault on the daughter and her ensuing death. The tangible harms
included the hospital, doctor, and funeral expenses for Bonnie's medical
care and burial. The intangible harms directly inflicted upon the parents
fall within the range of what the courts broadly term "emotional dis-
tress." An analysis of the factual events following the grievous assault on
the daughter will indicate the broad effect of the assault on the psyches
of the parents.
From the moment that Bonnie's mother opened the door early in the
morning to find several uniformed policemen asking for her daughter, 5
she was assaulted by a range of emotions: shock, surprise, and fear. Upon
viewing the aftermath of the assault in her daughter's room, it is reasona-
ble to assume that the mother was overcome with revulsion, shock, fear,
anger, horror, and sorrow. During the vigil in the hospital, the same emo-
tional reactions would be multiplied as the parents "relived" in their
minds the grisly scene in Bonnie's room following the attack, as well as
envisioned the actual attack as it might have occurred while they were
asleep nearby. Upon the death of their daughter, the grieving process
would begin.
The parents of Bonnie Garland are only two of the innumerable third-
party victims who have suffered from the wrongful death of a child. Be-
cause the "emotional distress" suffered by the Garlands was comprised of
with the thought of losing Bonnie to other men. W. GAYLIN, supra note 5, at 206-41.
" Carrington, supra note 10, at 458-59. One appropriate means of affording third-party
victims a catharsis would be to allow the surviving relatives a voice in the courtroom. Were
the judge to allow a survivor to make a statement before the court at the time of sentencing,
the surviving parent would at least feel as though he or she had had a part in the
proceedings.
1' W. GAYLIN, supra note 5, at 12. Similarly, cases in which the defendant's sentence is
plea-bargained or in which the defendant "escapes" on what a victim would consider a tech-
nicality, although constitutionally correct, leave parent-victims feeling less-than-adequately
recompensed for the permanent loss of their child.
"' 554 F. Supp. at 311.
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so many elements, the wrongful death of their child provides a framework
for analyzing all the harms engendered within the term "emotional dis-
tress" and the availability of civil remedies for each of those "separable"
harms."6
The tragedy of the Garlands will be used as a vehicle to assess the suc-
cess of legislatures and courts in enacting and interpreting wrongful death
statutes. The important question becomes whether the courts and legisla-
tures have adequately addressed the problem of parental psychic injuries
resulting from the death of a child. The analysis will focus on the at-
tempts in the common law, through the recognition of the torts of inten-
tional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, to remedy other ele-
ments of psychic harm arising from the wrongful death of a child.
The three difficulties that the courts have had in both stages of the
process will be examined: 1) the barrier of recognizing psychic harm as a
compensable injury; 2) the elusiveness of the definitional standards em-
ployed by the courts; and 3) the strictures the courts have placed on vic-
tims in order to constrain the cause of action. Finally, the Note will ana-
lyze tort liability for the intentional infliction of emotional distress to
third-party victims based on recklessness: the rationale for liability and
the scope of the action.
III. WRONGFUL DEATH AND PSYCHIC HARM
The reluctance of the courts to compensate third-party victims of a
wrongful death for their emotional distress arises from the disparities be-
tween the disciplines of law and science in dealing with psychic harm.
Law is governed by rules.' Psychology and psychiatry are imprecise sci-
ences.' 8 Psychiatric and psychological evaluations of intangible emotional
harms do not coalesce with the law's requirement of quantitatively mea-
surable harms.
Damages for psychic harm are attacked for several reasons: 1) psychic
16 A new area of relief afforded to victims of crime is unavailable to the Garlands or
others similarly situated whose major injury is emotional. Victims' compensation plans have
been adopted in a majority of jurisdictions to compensate both direct and indirect victims of
crime. However, the programs compensate for tangible harms suffered by the individual.
Property damage compensation is generally barred, but recompense for medical or hospital
expenses is allowed.
The victims' compensation plans are an outgrowth of the public's awareness of the grow-
ing crime problem and the further recognition of the number of victims who have suffered
and for whom no avenue of recovery is available. See generally Carrington, supra note 10;
Harland, Compensating the Victims of Crime, 14 CRIM. L. BULL. 203 (1978); Hoelzel, A
Survey of 27 Victim Compensation Programs, 63 JUDICATURE 483 (1980); Note, supra note
11.
", E. POLLACK, JURISPRUDENCE (1979). "By rules I mean precepts attaching a definite
detailed legal consequence to a definite detailed state of facts or situation of fact." Id. at
639.
"' Wasmuth, Psychosomatic Disease and the Law, 7 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 34 (1958).
1983-84]
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harm is intangible and therefore difficult to measure as compared to
other, tangible personal injuries; 2) the assessment of psychic harm is
speculative; and 3) psychic harm claims are susceptible to fraud.1 9 The
law recognized psychic harm as a compensable injury only when the
medical sciences were able to present clear evidence to substantiate the
injury.20
The civil courts have defined psychic harm generally as "emotional dis-
tress" and specifically through such terms as "a shock upon the sensibili-
ties,".21 "fright,"22 "mental anguish, ' 28 and "grief. '2 4 The element of emo-
tional distress most commonly associated with the wrongful death of a
child is "grief" or "mental anguish."
Grief is an assault upon the sensibilities.2" As it is an assault suffered
by most at the loss of a loved one, it is generally not compensable under
the law. However, when grief follows a death intentionally or negligently
caused, liability should follow.
The wrongful death of a child at the hands of an intentional or negli-
gent wrongdoer will generally cause an emotional reaction different in
kind from that occasioned by a child's death from disease or other "natu-
ral" causes. '28 The severity of the emotional distress in general, and the
grief reaction in particular, aroused by a child's death are associated with
individual expectations.2 7 Prior to advances in the medical sciences, par-
ents often did not expect their children to survive infancy, much less
grow to adulthood. As medical science progressed and the infant-mortal-
ity rate declined, expectations altered. Correspondingly, it is rare for a
child not to outlive its parents. The loss of a child is ranked as one of the
most emotionally trying experiences in the life of a parent.28
19 Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV. L. REV.
1033, 1033-35 (1936).
20 Wasmuth, supra note 18, at 34.
" Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
" Watson v. Dilts, 116 Iowa 249, 89 N.W. 1068 (1902).
23 Kelley v. Ohio R.R. Co., 58 W. Va. 216, 52 S.E. 520 (1905).
24 Wilson v. Lund, 80 Wash. 2d 91, 491 P.2d 1287 (1971).
25 The mental suffering or grief occasioned by the loss of a loved one has forever been a
subject of poets and philosophers. As suggested by Henry David Thoreau, each individual
loses a part of himself when a beloved dies. "I have touched a body which was flexible and
warm, yet tenantless-and warmed by what fire?.... I perceive that we partially die our-
selves through sympathy at the death of each of our friends or near relatives. Each such
experience is an assault on our vital force." H.D. THOREAU, JOURNAL (XII, 420, Feb. 3,
1859), quoted in MURRAY, HENRY DAVID THOREAU (1973).
26 See, e.g., M. SIMPSON, THE FACTS OF DEATH (1979). To have a child die from a disease
such as cancer is tragic, but eventually reconcilable when a parent weighs the alternative of
having the child suffer the ravages of the disease with its attendant pain and suffering. But
to have a child brutally die from the intentional act of another is totally irreconcilable and
incomprehensible and, therefore, could well exacerbate the emotional reaction.
17 C.M. PARKES, BEREAVEMENT STUDIES OF GRIEF IN ADULT LIFE 123 (1972).
28 Id.
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Grief is also experienced and suffered in correlation to the relationship
between the parties.
Most of the richness and beauty of life is derived from the close
relationship that each individual has with a small number of
other human beings-mother, father, brother, sister, husband,
wife, son, daughter and a small cadre of close friends. With each
person in this small group, the individual has a uniquely close
attachment or bond. Much of the joy and sorrow of life revolves
around attachments or affectional relationships-making them,
breaking them, preparing for them and adjusting to their loss
caused by death.9
Grief is the one common denominator involving all parents who have
suffered the wrongful death of a child, and the statutory action is the
general avenue of relief available. Therefore, the ability of the legislatures
through the promulgation of wrongful-death statutes and of the courts
through the interpretation of those statutes to remedy the emotional
harm will be analyzed. The disinclination of both the courts and the legis-
latures to deal appropriately with emotional distress is particularly ap-
parent in the evolution of the statutory action.
The American courts adopted the English common-law rules and have
been struggling ever since to rid themselves of the bondage of the prece-
dents. The rule of law fashioned by Lord Ellenborough in 1808 that "in a
civil court the death of a human being could not be complained of as an
injury" 0 effectively barred survivors from a common-law action for
wrongful death. Claims for psychic injuries were barred by Lord Wen-
sleydale's pronouncement that "mental pain or anxiety, the law cannot
value and does not pretend to redress, when the unlawful act causes that
alone. 3 1
Lord Ellenborough's decision in Baker v. Bolton, 2 having met with
great disfavor, was overturned in England with the passage of Lord
Campbell's Act in 1846. 8- Parents and aggrieved survivors were thereafter
provided with a statutory basis for recovery which did not include or ex-
clude any particular element of damages.3 4 As there had been no com-
19 M. KLAUS & J. KENNELL, MATERNAL-INFANT BONDING 1 (1976). See, e.g., Leibson, Re-
covery of Damages for Emotional Distress Caused by Physical Injuries to Another, 15
J. FAM. L. 163 (1976).
o Baker v. Bolton, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (K.B. 1808).
" Lynch v. Knight, 9 H.L.C. 577, 11 Eng. Rep. 854 (1861).
8" 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (K.B. 1808).
" Lord Campbell's Act (Fatal Accidents Act), 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., ch. 93.
34
And be it enacted, That every such Action shall be for the Benefit of the Wife,
Husband, Parent, and Child of the Person whose Death shall be brought by and in
the Name of the Executor or Administrator of the Person deceased; and in every
such Action the Jury may give such Damages as they may think proportioned to
1983-84]
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mon-law action for wrongful death, it is not surprising that American
statutes modeled after the English act were generally narrowly inter-
preted under the premise that statutes in derogation of the common law
were to be construed strictly. 5
The first English case to interpret the new wrongful death act, Blake v.
Midland R. Co.,3 6 advanced the rule that while the widow could maintain
an action in her own name for the loss of her husband, the action was to
be governed by the pecuniary losses suffered by the wife, disallowing re-
covery for "wounded feelings. '3 7
The pecuniary-loss rule is particularly outmoded when applied to ac-
tions brought for the wrongful death of children. Children today no
longer contribute to the wealth of the family as had been the case in the
agrarian, or newly industrialized, nineteenth century. The loss suffered by
the family in the twentieth century is much more the loss of the child
than the loss of the contribution.
The judges so ruling . . . were merely interpreting the statute in
accordance with the social conditions of the day, which, presuma-
bly, the legislative body had in mind in the enactment of the leg-
islation then under consideration. The rulings reflect the philoso-
phy of the times, its ideals and its social conditions. It was the
generation of the debtor's prisons, of some 200 or more capital
offenses and of the public flogging of women. It was an era when
ample work could be found for the agile bodies and nimble fin-
gers of small children. . . .This, then, was the day from which
our precedents come, a day when employment of children of
tender years was the accepted practice and their pecuniary con-
tributions to the family both substantial and provable. 9
Generally, societal changes have not been reflected within amended
the Injury resulting from such Death to the Parties respectively for whom and for
whose Benefit such Action shall be brought; and the Amount so recovered, after
deducting the Costs not recovered from the Defendant, shall be divided amongst
the beforementioned Parties in such Shares as the Jury by their Verdict shall find
and direct.
Id. (emphasis added).
35 S. SPEISER, 1 RECOVERY FOR WRONGFuL DEATH 2d § 1.12 (1975).
"' Q.B. 93, 118 Eng. Rep. 35 (1852).
s7 See Speiser & Malawer, An American Tragedy: Damages for Mental Anguish of Be-
reaved Relatives in Wrongful Death Actions, 51 TUL. L. REV. 1, 7 (1976) (the authors dis-
cuss the arguments raised concerning the construction to be given the statutes).
Wycko v. Gnodtke, 361 Mich. 331, 335, 105 N.W.2d 118, 121-22 (1960), overruled,
Breckon v. Franklin Fuel Co., 383 Mich. 251, 174 N.W.2d 836 (1970). Although Wycko was
subsequently overruled, it remains important both for its reasoning and for the fact that the
legislature in Michigan reaffirmed the Wycko decision by amending its wrongful-death stat-
ute. See infra note 56.
" Wycko v. Gnodtke, 361 Mich. 331, 335, 105 N.W.2d 118, 120-21 (1960), overruled,
Breckon v. Franklin Fuel Co., 383 Mich. 251, 174 N.W.2d 836 (1970).
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wrongful-death statutes. The courts have felt compelled to adhere to the
principle of stare decisis, thereby deciding new cases based upon eighty-
year-old precedents.'
Actions for wrongful death of an adult may be seen as rather mercenary
propositions, since lawyers and the bereaved attempt to place a monetary
value on such items as loss of consortium, loss of companionship, and loss
of future earnings. However, the real tragedy arises in the wrongful death
of children.4 1 The vast majority of jurisdictions fail to recognize the par-
ents' actual though intangible harm arising from the loss of a child's life.42
These jurisdictions utilize the pecuniary-loss rule, which focuses on com-
putation of the amounts that the parents would have spent on necessaries
for the child as subtracted from the "worth" of the child. Worth is mea-
sured solely by what he might have earned or contributed to the family
until the age of majority. "That formula applies double-entry bookkeep-
ing to children as if they were profit-making machines: enter the child's
expectable contributions to the family exchequer and deduct the cost of
his upkeep and maintenance." '4 3
Arguably, had the action for wrongful death evolved through the com-
mon law, it would have adapted to societal changes as have other tort
actions. Straitjacketed by the strictures of the language and the initial
interpretations of the statutory enactments, the courts have generally
confined damages to quantitatively measurable elements. "The restriction
of death damages to pecuniary loss is an anachronism, held over from the
time when the rules of civil litigation were framed to give property rights
priority over human life."
Herbertson v. Russell,4" in which an award of $25,000 for the wrongful
death of a six-year-old was found to be excessive, is evidence of the ineq-
uities which arise when the damages awarded for the wrongful death of a
child are defined in terms of pecuniary loss as prescribed by statute and
interpreted by the court. The court in Herbertson would not "rewrite"
the legislation.
40 Herbertson v. Russell, 150 Colo. 110, 371 P.2d 442 (1962).
41 See Strong & Jacobson, Such Damages as Are Just: A Proposal for More Realistic
Compensation in Wrongful Death Cases, 43 MONT. L. REV. 55 (1982).
4' Speiser & Malawer, supra note 37.
The injustice of the pecuniary loss concept had unreasonable effects on the dece-
dent's family. Having just suffered a grievous personal loss, the bereaved relative
is then told by his lawyer that the decedent is "to be considered merely as if he
had been a part of the goods in his shop," and that the law recognizes only the
injury based upon the decedent's financial production, despite judicial condemna-
tion of the immorality of this position more than a century and a half ago.
Id. at 19.
" Lambert, Joost & Rheingold, Recent Important Tort Cases, N.A.C.C.A. L.J. 48, 197
(1964).
" Speiser & Malawer, supra note 37, at 7-8.
45 150 Colo. 110, 371 P.2d 422 (1962).
1983-841
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The suggestion that this Court should depart from its prior an-
nouncements defining the measure of damages recoverable under
our wrongful death statute would do utter violence to the well-
established rule of statutory construction that when a legislature
repeatedly re-enacts a statute which has theretofore received a
settled judicial construction, there can be no doubt as to the legis-
lative intent, and in such circumstances it must be considered
that the particular statute is re-enacted with the understanding
that there be adherence by the judiciary to its former
construction.4"
The special concurring opinion in Herbertson took exception to the
premise that the damages to be awarded in a wrongful death were solely
for the "benefits lost" through the death, and were not to be an award for
the solatium or grief of the living occasioned by the death of their rela-
tive, no matter "how dear. '47 "I would from this day forward write 'finis'
to such doctrine as being a debasing and melancholy chapter in the juris-
prudence of this state. ' 48 The concurrence further noted the anomalous
situation existing in Colorado in the denial of recovery for the "real" in-
jury, that is the mental anguish suffered by the survivors, yet the recogni-
tion of a cause of action for the psychic harm suffered by a parent if a
child's body has been molested after death.49 Had the six-year-old's body
in Herbertson been mishandled after a natural death, the court would
have allowed recovery for the ensuing mental anguish caused to the par-
ents. 50 When the emotional distress arises from the wrongful killing of the
41 Id. at 117, 371 P.2d at 426.
17 Id. at 118, 371 P.2d at 427.
48 Id.
" Id. at 126, 371 P.2d at 430 (Frantz, J., concurring).
50 The anomalous situation noted by the concurrence in Herbertson occurs in a majority
of jurisdictions throughout the country. The courts have long recognized that a parent or
loved one is in an extremely susceptible state following the death of a relative, whether the
relative's death arose from natural causes or was caused by another.
Because of the relative's emotional state at the time of the death, the courts have allowed
recovery for emotional distress if the body of the deceased is in some manner molested. The
courts clearly recognize the mishandling of bodies as a cause of emotional distress while
failing to recognize that the death itself, when caused by the negligent or intentional act of
another, would cause a similar psychic injury. See, e.g., Papieves v. Lawrence, 435 Pa. 373,
263 A.2d 118 (1970) (mental anguish and emotional disturbance stated a cause of action
arising from the defendant's intentional acts in withholding the body of the plaintiff's son
and burying the body without authorization); Johnson v. Woman's Hosp., 527 S.W.2d 133
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1975) (action brought against a hospital and physician for breach of con-
tract to bury and for outrageous conduct in connection with display to the mother of the
body of her premature infant who had expired shortly after birth and had been placed in a
gallon jar of formaldehyde); Corrigal v. Ball & Dodd Funeral Home, 89 Wash. 2d 959, 577
P.2d 580 (1978) (complaint sustained against a funeral home which had agreed to cremate
son's body, place his remains in a urn, and deliver the urn to the plaintiff, but which failed
to place the remains in the urn and caused the plaintiff to handsift through what she
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child, the injury to the survivor under a wrongful-death act remains
unremedied.
Legislatures have not been totally unresponsive to the inequities
presented in wrongful-death actions where a defendant may be exoner-
ated from liability in damages for the death of a child but accountable if
the child is merely injured. 1 A number of legislatures have amended stat-
utes to include recovery for all damages, tangible and intangible, associ-
ated with the death." The judiciary has also on occasion refused to con-
strue the statutes strictly. Rather than defining pecuniary loss as the loss
of contribution, the court redefines the term to include the worth of the
life lost.
In Wycko v. Gnodtke,5 3 a fourteen-year-old boy was killed by a negli-
gent driver. The Michigan court asked and answered its own rhetorical
question: "What then, is the pecuniary loss suffered because of the taking
of a child's life? It is the pecuniary value of the life."'5 4 Had the court
adhered to the pecuniary-loss rule, it would have been forced to calculate
in terms of dollars and cents the future contributions that a fourteen-
year-old boy would have made to the family. "We are dealing with a fic-
tion, the fiction, that under today's conditions, not those of 1846, the mi-
nor child is a breadwinner. He is not. He is an expense. A blessed ex-
pense, it is true, but nonetheless an expense." 5
The court defined the pecuniary value of the life of the child in terms
of companionship.56 Nevertheless, the court barred recovery for the "real"
thought was "packing material" only to discover that she was physically handling her son's
remains).
' W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 902 (4th ed. 1971).
" See S. SPEISER, supra note 35, at 336. See also Wadrip v. McGarity, 270 Ark. 305,
605 S.W.2d 5 (1980) (compensation for mental anguish allowed under the statute for more
than 20 years).
" 361 Mich. 331, 105 N.W.2d 118 (1960), overruled, Breckon v. Franklin Fuel Co., 313
Mich. 251, 174 N.W.2d 836 (1970).
361 Mich. at 338, 105 N.W.2d at 122.
That this barbarous concept of pecuniary loss to a parent from the death of his
child should control our decisions today is a reproach to justice. We are still turn-
ing, actually, for guidance in decision, to "one of the darkest chapters in the his-
tory of childhood." Yet in other areas of the law the legal and social standards of
1846 are as dead as the coachman and his postilions who guided the coaches of its
society through the dark and muddy streets, past the gibbets where still hung the
toll of the day's executions. In most areas the development of the law has paral-
leled the enlightened conscience of our people. Examples abound. We no longer
tolerate the intentional infliction of mental suffering. Illness from such cause is
not, we now recognize, imaginary.
Id. at 337, 105 N.W.2d at 121.
5 Id. at 341, 105 N.W.2d at 123.
56 Id. at 340, 105 N.W.2d at 122. As previously indicated, Wycko was overturned and the
Michigan legislature responded by amending the wrongful-death statute to include "loss of
companionship" as a compensable injury. See supra note 38. The action by the legislature is
indicative of the manner in which courts and legislatures can implicitly communicate with
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injury: the sorrow and anguish of the parents caused by the death.
Green v. Bittner5 7 involved the death of a high-school student who had
been described as "everybody's daughter."" The jury had found no pecu-
niary loss and awarded no damages. The trial judge concluded:
[I]t would be reasonable for this jury to come to [the] conclusion
that the value of her services to babysit or to dry dishes was far
exceeded by the cost to the family of feeding, clothing and edu-
cating her. The jury in this particular case followed literally the
language of the statute and came to the conclusion that they
reached.59
The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the marketplace value of
companionship which would have aided the parents as they aged was a
measurable and therefore compensable element of damages. The court
suggested that such damages could be calculated by analogy to the ser-
vices rendered by hired companions, nurses, or counselors.6 0 However, the
court felt compelled by the statute to exclude damages for emotional
distress.
[W]e know of no public policy which would prohibit awarding
damages that fully compensate for the loss of emotional pleasure
in this situation, or indeed for the emotional suffering caused by
the death. We recognize that our prohibition against such dam-
ages deprives the surviving parent of compensation for the real
loss. That prohibition is not a matter of our choice, rather it is
fundamental to the legislation. 1
Green is not atypical. Courts and juries have been straitjacketed by
legislation which defines pecuniary loss narrowly, limiting awards to tan-
gible harms. Juries are left to measure the loss of the love and the life of a
young child or teenager by the value of babysitting fees and dishwashing
services. Even in jurisdictions which have expanded pecuniary loss to in-
each other. The courts observe first-hand the individuals affected by the laws. Legislatures,
on the other hand, are not faced on a day-to-day basis with individual plaintiffs. The politi-
cal body is most responsive to political issues. The grief and anguish suffered by an individ-
ual at the wrongful death of a child is not a politically attractive issue.
The Wycko court had obviously become well-aware of the inequities apparent in wrong-
ful-death actions in which damages are restricted to pecuniary losses and had attempted to
rectify the wrong. In responding to the perceived need, the court left itself open to the
charge of acting as a "superlegislature." However, in this instance, the legislature itself, cog-
nizant through Wycko of the need to amend the statute, rewrote the law and reaffirmed the
Wycko judgment.
" 85 N.J. 1, 424 A.2d 210 (1980).
" Id. at 4, 424 A.2d at 211.
" Id. at 6, 424 A.2d at 212.
" Id. at 1, 424 A.2d at 210.
*' Id. at 13, 424 A.2d at 216 (footnote omitted).
[Vol. 32:641
12https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol32/iss4/6
SURVIVING PARENTS' REMEDIES
clude the loss of companionship of the child, the parent must support the
damage with evidence of the pecuniary loss of benefits.
62
The most-frequently-voiced opposition to allowing damages for emo-
tional distress arises from the speculative nature of the injury. s However,
when the courts determine that the loss of companionship, society, or ad-
vice of a child is compensable, while barring recovery for grief and mental
anguish because of the intangible nature of the injury, the reasoning is
open to criticism." First, it is difficult to justify loss of companionship as
a purely pecuniary loss. Companionship is inextricably intertwined with
the relationship of the parent and the child. When companionship has
been lost because of the wrongful death of a child, it is an emotional loss
caused by the premature severing of the parental bond to the child. While
"companionship" might have evolved into "advice" in later years, at the
time of the death it is undoubtedly an element of emotional distress.
What has been lost by the parent is the love and affection of the child.
The services that a child might render in the future in the way of nurs-
ing care or advice to an aged parent are more speculative than the psychic
injury flowing immediately from the wrongful death that the parent has
suffered. Psychic harm is measurable through evidence rendered by psy-
chiatric testimony. 5 In categorizing "companionship" as a pecuniary loss,
the courts are attempting to address the inequities with which they are
faced.
The Supreme Court of Washington in Wilson v. Lund"6 refused to ad-
here to a strict pecuniary-loss rule. The court reviewed an action for the
wrongful death of a five-year-old in a riding mishap. The action was
6 Id. at 1, 424 A.2d at 210.
63 See, e.g., Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal.
Rptr. 33 (1963); Herbertson v. Russell, 150 Colo. 110, 371 P.2d 422 (1962).
64
It is obvious that in most death cases the emotional impact of the loss of a beloved
person is the most significant damage suffered by surviving relatives. The stric-
ture of pecuniary loss has gradually deteriorated in American law so that it now
stands as an impious fiction which rubs salt into the wounds of bereaved families,
and serves as an obstacle to the evenhanded administration of justice in wrongful
death cases .... The addition of mental anguish as an element of damages would
allow judges and juries to make awards in the proper categories for the proper
reasons, after careful consideration of the real damages that experience has taught
us usually flow from the death of a human being.
Speiser & Malawer, supra note 37, at 17-18 (footnote omitted).
65
Our brethern in the law have for many decades been seeking redress for mental
pain and suffering in tort actions. Inasmuch as they had no objective tests with
which to verify psychic trauma, damages were frequently denied. In recent years,
however, medicine has taken a greater interest in the field of mental pain and
suffering. It is recognized today as a distinct clinical entity.
Wasmuth, supra note 18, at 35.
00 80 Wash. 2d 91, 491 P.2d 1287 (1971).
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brought under an amended wrongful-death statute which included "loss
of love and companionship of the child and for injury to or destruction of
the parent-child relationship." The court then rejected the argument that
the mental anguish of the parents was non-compensable under the
statute.
We could not conclude that recovery for "injury to or destruction
of the parent-child relationship" differs from recovery for mental
anguish, without applying a totally unrealistic and conceptually
indefensible surgical scalpel technique to distinguish or separate
damage to the parent-child relationship from emotional damages.
To attempt to do so would be to treat this case as it it concerned
so many pounds of potatoes, other lowly vegetables or material
substances of some kind-rather than human feelings, responses
and emotions.
6 7
Inroads have been made through broader interpretations of statutes
which allow a jury to award damages "as it deems fair and just.""6 These
statutes have been read expansively to incorporate all damages, including
mental anguish.6 However, evolution in wrongful-death actions will con-
tinue to be a slow process because of the necessity for legislation as well
as the tension between legislative enactments and judicial interpretations
of those enactments.
Most jurisdictions have recognized a protected interest in mental tran-
quility as evidenced in the action for intentional infliction of emotional
distress."' In such jurisdictions it may be assumed that mental distress
will eventually be a compensable injury in a wrongful-death action. How-
ever, in most jurisdictions the survivors of a child's wrongful death will be
barred from recovery for the real injury suffered.
There is absolutely no reason why this element of damage should
be considered in millions of personal injury cases . . . while on
the other hand a majority of our states force juries to disregard
the most humanly significant item of damages in death cases: the
emotional impact of the loss of a beloved human being.71
67 Id. at 100, 491 P.2d at 1292.
S. SPEISER, supra note 35, at 327.
69 Id.
70 See infra note 72 and accompanying text.
71 S. SPEISER, supra note 35, at 345. As a subsidiary issue to the award of damages for
emotional harms, it has been argued that allowing juries to consider such injuries will tend
to escalate awards and correspondingly raise insurance premiums. Two answers to the
charge have been set forth: first, jury verdicts are procedural matters which are governed by
the court hearing the matter and which are subject to remittitur; second, the states which
have amended wrongful-death acts to encompass psychic injuries have also produced awards
lower than those in states which bar recovery. Juries are not unaware of the injuries which
have been suffered and have in their discretion made awards which would far surpass the
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The parents of Bonnie Garland and others similarly situated will con-
tinue to be forced to adhere to the fiction of computing the future worth
of the child on which they might have depended. While Bonnie Garland
might have contributed to the family exchequer upon employment after
graduation from Yale, it is totally unclear in what form that contribution
might have been made. However, under the anachronistic pecuniary-loss
rule those purported future support contributions are the basis of the
parents' claim for damages rather than the real emotional injury suffered.
IV. INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
Grief or mental anguish arising from a child's wrongful death may be
intertwined with other emotional-distress elements when the child's
wrongful death is caused by intentional or negligent conduct and where
the parents have become involved either as witnesses or as "participants"
in the action. The Garlands and other third-party victims may seek relief
through an action for intentional or negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress for such specific elements as shock, horror, or fear.
The majority of jurisdictions recognize a legally protected interest in
emotional tranquility.72 The common-law action has grown and evolved
more readily than the statutory wrongful-death action.
The landmark case of Wilkinson v. Downtown7 s recognized intentional
infliction of emotional distress as a separate cause of action. The defen-
dant-practical joker had informed the plaintiff that her husband was ly-
ing in the street with two broken legs, thereby causing severe emotional
distress to the wife. Prior to Wilkinson, any claim for the mental anguish
a plaintiff suffered was derived from a specific wrong, such as an assault
or battery. The claim for mental distress had merely been a parasitic ele-
ment of damages.74 Based on the same distrust of intangible psychic harm
accounting computations under the pecuniary-loss rule. Speiser & Malawer, supra note 37,
at 19.
72 See, e.g., Womach v. Eldridge, 215 Va. 338, 210 S.E.2d 145 (1974); Knierim v. Izzo, 22
Ill. 2d 73, 174 N.E.2d 157 (1961). See also Harris v. Jones, 281 Md. 550, 564, 380 A.2d 611,
613 (1977) (plaintiff failed to meet the burden of proof but the court made an extensive
compilation of the jurisdictions recognizing the cause of action). See generally Handford,
Intentional Infliction of Mental Distress: Analysis of the Growth of a Tort, 8 ANGLO.-AM.
L. REV. 1 (1979); Langhenry, Personal Injury Law and Emotional Distress, 1981 J. PsYcHI-
ATRY & L. 91; Millard, Intentionally and Negligently Inflicted Emotional Distress: Toward
a Coherent Reconciliation, 15 IND. L. REV. 617 (1982); Prosser, Intentional Infliction of
Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MICH. L. REV. 874 (1939); Note, Torts-Outrage: Liabil-
ity for the Intentional Infliction of Mental and Emotional Harm, 14 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
305 (1978).
" 2 Q.B. 57 (1897).
" See, e.g., Bartow v. Smith, 149 Ohio St. 301, 78 N.E.2d 735 (1948), overruled, Yeager
v. Local Union 20, 6 Ohio St. 3d 374, 453 N.E.2d 666 (1983) (until August 1983, Ohio was
the only jurisdiction in the country that refused to recognize the independent tort of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress absent a separate cause of action such as assault).
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as noted in wrongful-death actions with regard to grief, 5 the American
courts, over the last eighty years, have slowly and carefully evolved bases
of liability to protect the emotional tranquility of plaintiffs while at-
tempting to confine the liability of defendants.
The courts have developed criteria necessary to sustain the cause of
action.7 6 The conduct by the defendant must be of such a nature as to be
considered outrageous.7 The outrageous conduct directed at the plaintiff
must be greater than the daily insults one is subjected to when merely
living in normal society.78
Liability for outrageous conduct is directly related to the concept of
moral blameworthiness. Generally, tort law concerns itself with social
fault, as exemplified in negligence actions, where the defendant is liable if
he fails to conform his conduct to a standard of care prescribed by soci-
ety.70 When the actor's conduct is of such a nature as to be termed "out-
rageous," the conduct is more closely and clearly judged by standards of
moral irresponsibility and moral fault.8 0 The visceral reaction of the ordi-
nary person is the measure of the character of the act. l
A comparison may be drawn between the concept of outrage as the ba-
71 See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
78 See W. PROSSER, supra note 51, at 49-62; see also Handford, supra note 72.
77 The RESTATEMENT definition of "outrageousness" has been criticized as being circular
because of the use of the conclusory term "outrage" to define outrageousness. While such
criticism is valid, it becomes apparent that attempting to define by other terms conduct
which evokes a visceral reaction will ultimately result in the use of even more imprecise
terms such as "reprehensible" or "revolting." For criticism of the RESTATEMENT see Theis,
The Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress: A Need for Limits on Liability, 28 DE
PAUL L. Rxv. 275 (1977).
78 Prosser, supra note 72, at 887.
Bauer, The Degree of Moral Fault As Affecting Defendant's Liability, 81 U. PA.
L. REV. 586 (1933). "It would shock the feelings of a court to be as lenient with the inten-
tional or even reckless wrongdoer as with the person merely failing, perhaps by very little, to
live up to the standard of care required." Id. at 588.
1* RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1977). "Liability has been found only where the
conduct has been so outrageous in character and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all
possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a
civilized community." Id. § 46 comment d.
" Id. "Generally the case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average mem-
ber of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to ex-
claim, 'outrageous.'" Id.
The concept of outrage is based on human reactions. "Knee-jerk" emotional reactions
occur in everyday situations. The brakes of a car squeal around a corner, causing the person
standing on the corner to grit his teeth or suck in a gasp of breath or back away from the
curb. A mother working in one room of the home hears a loud crash in another room, closely
followed by a child's cry. The mother immediately responds mentally, emotionally, and
physically. However, these normal occurrences and reactions are different in kind from the
reactions envisioned by the RESTATEMENT in its "circular" definition. The RESTATEMENT is
attempting to define conduct which evokes not only an immediate "knee-jerk" response, but
one which goes to the heart of social morality. The conduct elicits not merely a momentary
reaction, but a response which continues unabated.
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sis of a tort and the rationale for punitive damages in tort. Punitive, or
exemplary, damages have been a viable part of actions in which the de-
fendant's conduct was deemed to be "wanton" and "willful." 82 The theory
supporting the concept is that the award of exemplary damages punishes
the defendant for the reprehensible character of his act. The award is
justified as a specific deterrent to the defendant and a general deterrent
to others. 83 When punitive damages arise out of an action in tort for tres-
pass, assault, or battery, the punitive-damage award serves as "public jus-
tice" for an act of the defendant which did not fall within the perimeters
of culpability under the criminal law.8 The plaintiff's compensable injury
for an assault or a trespass may have been nominal, but the defendant's
conduct was egregious enough for a jury to "punish" in tort." The defen-
dant's conduct in both instances is outrageous. In one instance the con-
duct forms the basis for an award of exemplary damages; in the other, it
forms the basis of liability for emotional distress.
The actor's intentional and outrageous conduct must have caused ex-
treme distress to the plaintiff.86 Initially, the plaintiff was required to
substantiate the emotional harm with physical injury. The emotional
harm would be corroborated by physical evidence of insomnia, nausea,
vomiting, or miscarriage.87 Physical manifestation became the benchmark
of psychic harm. For example, had Richard Herrin repeatedly threatened
Bonnie Garland over the telephone to the point that she could not study,
eat, or sleep, he would not have assaulted her in that she would not have
been put in fear of an immediate offensive contact. However, her insom-
nia would have affirmed the emotional distress she suffered. Similarly,
had Herrin harassed the parents with threats of killing Bonnie, thereby
causing the parents emotional distress, Herrin would have been liable in
tort.88
8' Levit, Punitive Damages: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, 688 INS. L.J. 257 (1980).
8' Belli, Punitive Damages: Their History, Their Use and Their Worth in Present-Day
Society, 49 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 1 (1980). See also Note, Punitive Damages and the Drunken
Driver, 8 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 117 (1980) (the author advocates justifying the award of puni-
tive damages in actions involving drunken driving on both the specific and the general de-
terrent values).
Another justification for punitive damages is the prevention of self-help, that is self-styled
revenge. Belli, supra note 83, at 5. As the criminal law was designed to extract a public
punishment to avoid private revenge, tort law imposed punitive damages for those actions
which escaped prosecution under criminal law.
" Richard Herrin's act was not punishable under the criminal law for the harm it im-
posed on the Garlands as it failed to meet the requisites of intentionally caused harm. See
infra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
88 Belli, supra note 83, at 5.
88 W. PROSSER, supra note 51, at 56.
87 See, e.g., Hill v. Kimball, 76 Tex. 210, 13 S.W. 19 (1890) (plaintiff's emotional distress
"verified" by miscarriage).
See Knierim v. Izzo, 22 Ill. 2d 73, 174 N.E.2d 157 (1961) (action was sustained for
emotional distress when the defendant threatened to murder plaintiff's husband and then
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One of the key elements in the action for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress is the relationship of the parties. Relationship is deter-
mined by focusing on the duty owed by the defendant, as exemplified in
actions involving common carriers. 9 Similarly, in actions involving the
outrageous conduct of over-zealous debt collectors,90 insurance agents, 91
practical jokers 2 and funeral directors,93 the relationship was founded
both on the intent of the defendant and the susceptibility of the plaintiff.
A prime example is Meyer v. Nottger9 4 The court was particularly aware
of the "delicate" emotional state of a bereaved relative at the time of the
death of a loved one. Among other reprehensible acts and omissions of
the funeral director hired by the plaintiff was his refusal to produce the
body of the deceased for viewing. The defendant insinuated that the de-
ceased was in a condition which would horrify the relative.9 5 After re-
peated pleas and refusals, the director finally relented. The wrongful
"withholding" of the body, coupled with other egregious acts and omis-
sions of the funeral director taken in conjunction with the plaintiff's de-
pendence on the defendant, sustained the cause of action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress.9 6
The tort has been "legitimized" through its recognition in an over-
whelming majority of jurisdictions.9 The perimeters of the emotional in-
tegrity to be protected have become definitionally more precise due in
large part to the evidence made available through the advances in psychi-
fulfilled the threat). McKissick v. Schroeder, 70 Wis. 825, 235 N.W.2d 686 (1975). Schroeder
involved an action in which the plaintiff's son had been shot when fleeing from police at the
rear of his home. After the shooting the police refused to allow the plaintiff to call for
medical assistance for her dying son and continued to question the plaintiff at length
89 St. Louis A.& T. R.R. v. Mackie, 71 Tex. 491, 9 S.W. 451 (1888). See also Handford,
supra note 72, at 9. Tracing the history of the growth of the action from its early recogni-
tion, the author notes the foundation of liability upon the relationship of the parties.
Following on the carrier cases, they also developed a similar liability in other situ-
ations where there was a special relationship necessitating respectful treat-
ment-in respect of innkeepers and telegraph companies. These forms of liability
were, of course, dependent on the special relationship between the parties, and in
the light of later developments were seen as involving conduct which was insuffi-
ciently serious to give rise to liability apart from this relationship .
Id.
go See, e.g., Barnett v. Collection Serv. Co., 214 Iowa 1303, 242 N.W. 25 (1932) (repeated
threats).
91 See, e.g., Eckenrode v. Life of Am. Ins. Co., 470 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1972) (withholding
life-insurance proceeds with knowledge of the adequacy of the claim and the need of the
plaintiff).
92 See, e.g., Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Roch, 160 Md. 189, A. 22 (1930) (wrapping up a
dead rat like a loaf of bread).
9' See, e.g., Meyer v. Nottger, 241 N.W.2d 911 (Iowa 1976).
94 Id.
o Id. at 915.
Id. at 913.
97 See supra note 72.
[Vol. 32:641
18https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol32/iss4/6
SURVIVING PARENTS' REMEDIES
atry and psychology. As the cause of action has evolved the plaintiff's
evidentiary burden concerning physically manifested emotional harm has
been mitigated.9 8 The burden of proof has not shifted; however, increas-
ingly the focus is on the intentional and outrageous nature of the defen-
dant's conduct as the measure of the emotional harm that would reasona-
bly follow."
Until very recently, even when the bounds of human decency had
seemingly been crossed by outrageous conduct, a few jurisdictions contin-
ued to dismiss the cause of action when physical injury had not resulted
from the emotional distress.' Adherence to this physical requirement in-
dicated that the psychic injury did not stand alone as a compensable
harm.
The elements of emotional distress occasioned by the actions of debt
collectors, funeral directors, and practical jokers differ markedly from
those which arise from the wrongful death of a child. The former actions
trigger elements of fear, embarrassment, and anxiety specific to the indi-
vidual. The latter encompasses the elements of fear for the child, anguish
at the loss of the child, horror at the circumstances of the event, and
shock at both the act and the consequences of the act. However, an action
for intentional infliction of emotional distress will not lie where a child
has been murdered, because the act was not directed at the parents. The
action by the parents will proceed under a theory of recklessness or
negligence.
V. NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
The evolution of a cause of action for intentional infliction of mental
distress has centered on only the two immediately affected parties. In
each instance, an actor directed his conduct specifically at the com-
plaining injured party. Third-party victims of the wrongful death of a
child have sought relief from the courts under principles of negligence as
bystanders to the wrongful death.' 0 ' The growth and evolution of the
third-party action for emotional distress sounding in negligence provides
hindsight reconstruction of the gradual recognition of the remedy, as well
as a basis for analysis of the artificiality of the strictures the courts have
placed on plaintiffs wanting to bring themselves within the range of
90 Texas was one of the earliest jurisdictions to recognize a legally protected interest in
emotional tranquility and to award damages for its invasion. However, Texas is one of the
few jurisdictions which continues to adhere to the requirement of physical manifestation of
injury. See, e.g., Duty v. General Fin. Co., 154 Tex. 16, 273 S.W.2d 64 (1954).
"9 Wilson v. Wilkins, 181 Ark. 137, 255 S.W.2d 428 (1930) (the court considered it rea-
sonable to expect the plaintiff to suffer severe emotional distress when a mob threatened to
lynch him unless he left town).
'o See supra note 74.
101 Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968) (mother and sister
witnessed child being negligently struck by an automobile).
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recovery.
As a plaintiff must sue "in her own right for a wrong personal to her
and not as the vicarious beneficiary of a breach of a duty to another," 102
the courts initially barred all recovery for emotional distress negligently
caused. From the general rule, the courts began to carve exceptions, be-
ginning with the doctrine of impact,108 progressing to a rather artificially
designed concept of "zone of danger,"'01 4 and in a minority of jurisdictions
resting on general negligence principles.'0 5
A. Impact
The initial expansion of liability came with the implementation of the
impact doctrine, which required that the plaintiff be physically touched
by the defendant's negligent act. The court in Mitchell v. Rochester Rail-
way '0 barred recovery when a negligently driven team of horses came
dangerously close to the plaintiff, causing her to experience great emo-
tional distress. The Mitchell court refused to award damages since no
physical impact occurred between the plaintiff and the tortfeasor.
0 7
Fearing fraudulent claims, the courts required impact to legitimize the
emotional distress. However, the courts failed to acknowledge the artifi-
cial nature of the benchmark; that is, the "impact" of a trivial jolt or
shock plays no part in causing the real harm. 0 8 Instead of guarding
against spurious claims, the courts were effectively barring seriously in-
jured plaintiffs who had not been "touched" by the defendant's
negligence.109
The arbitrariness of the impact rule eventually led the majority of
courts to reject the rule and draw a wider net of psychic protection
102 Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928). See also Prosser, Pal-
sgraf Revisited, 52 MIcH. L. REv. 1 (1953).
103 Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 345 (1896), overruled, Battalla v.
State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961); Burroughs v. Jordan, 456
S.W.2d 652 (Tenn. 1970) (plaintiff-wife denied recovery for emotional distress caused by
injuries to her husband and children where the plaintiff was actually in the vehicle involved
in the accident but did not receive any direct injuries).
104 Hopper v. United States, 244 F. Supp. 314 (D. Colo. 1965) (sibling witnessed the
negligent killing of her sister but was not endangered herself); Niederman v. Brodsky, 261
A.2d 84 (Pa. 1970); contra Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935) (recov-
ery barred when mother watched from house as defendant's vehicle ran child down).
10' Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104 (Iowa 1981); Portee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 417 A.2d
521 (1980) (helpless mother watched her son suffer and die when he became trapped in an
elevator).
10s 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896), overruled, Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176
N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961).
107 Id. at 108, 45 N.E. at 355.
108 W. PROSSER, supra note 51, at 331.
109 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, LAW OF TORTS 1034 (1956).
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around plaintiffs.1 0 The courts, in carving a larger exception to the gen-
eral rule barring recovery, progressed from requiring evidence of impact
to requiring evidence of the plaintiffs' fear for their own safety.""
B. Zone of Physical Danger
The zone-of-danger modification of the impact rule, as applied to by-
standers, requires that complainants suffer severe emotional distress with
physical manifestations arising from fear for their own safety as opposed
to fear for that of another."' If a parent witnessed the wrongful death of
her child in the street while she was looking through the window or
standing on the sidewalk, she was barred from recovery as she was in no
danger of being injured herself." 3
When the courts had required impact, they were still treating the
psychic injury as an element flowing from the negligent touching and,
therefore, still a parasitic element of the negligent act. While the zone-of-
danger rule indicates a final break from viewing the emotional distress
merely as a parasitic element of damages, the courts have substituted one
artificial barrier for another, as typified in Whetham v. Bismarck
Hospital."4
In Whetham, a mother of a newborn infant was denied recovery for
emotional distress because she was not within the zone of physical danger
when she witnessed a nurse drop her infant onto a tile floor.' 15 Similar
artificiality was present in Vaillancourt v. Medical Center Hospital.'1 A
husband was in the delivery room with his wife as she was giving birth.
Since the negligence which allegedly caused the death of the infant was
not alleged to have threatened the personal safety of the husband, he was
barred from recovery for the emotional distress arising from witnessing
the event. However, the wife's claim was sustained because she was
within the zone of danger by delivering the child and thus subject to rea-
sonable fear for her own safety.17
Limiting the claim to fear for personal safety ignores both the psycho-
logical and the common-sense appraisal that, in most instances involving
11 See, e.g., Towns v. Anderson, 195 Colo. 517, 579 P.2d 1163 (1978) (court abolished the
impact rule and allowed a child's cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress when he witnessed a gas explosion which lifted his house from its foundation while his
sister was inside).
"' Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33
(1963), overruled, Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
1,2 See Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969);
Guilmette v. Alexander, 128 Vt. 116, 259 A.2d 12 (1969).
" See Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935).
.14 197 N.W.2d 678 (N.D. 1972).
16 Id. at 684.
, 139 Vt. 138, 425 A.2d 92 (1980).
. Id. at 143, 425 A.2d at 95.
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parents and children, a fear for the child injured or about-to-be injured
outweighs a parent's personal concerns." 's
Once accepting the view that a plaintiff threatened with an injuri-
ous impact may recover for bodily harm resulting from shock
without impact, it is easy to agree that to hinge recovery on the
speculative issue whether the parent was shocked through fear for
herself or for her children "would be discreditable to any system
of jurisprudence."'119
C. Zone of Psychic Danger-The General Negligence Minority
The artificiality of the zone-of-danger requirement was exemplified in
Dillon v. Legg,120 in which a mother and daughter witnessed the death of
another daughter, who was struck by a vehicle negligently driven by the
defendant. The mother was initially barred from recovery because she
had been safely on the sidewalk. The witnessing daughter was recom-
pensed for emotional distress because she might have been within the
zone of danger. The court considered and discarded each of the rules that
had been historically applied: the initial position of disallowing recovery
for emotional distress as a separate tort; the imposition of the arbitrary
impact rule; and finally, the constraints of the zone-of-danger require-
ment. ' "The successive abandonment of these positions exposes the
weakness of artificial abstractions which bar recovery contrary to the gen-
eral rules.' 22 The court adopted a general negligence analysis.'23 By de-
fining the limits of the action with a set of criteria including relationship
of the parties, proximity of the third-party plaintiff to the accident, and
degrees of emotional distress suffered directly from the impact of the sen-
sory and contemporaneous observation of the accident, the court drew
perimeters around the scope of foreseeability. 2
11 In both Whetham, in which the nurse negligently dropped a newborn on the floor, and
Vaillancourt, in which the father was not in any danger when the doctors negligently failed
to deliver the fetus alive, neither parent would ever suffer fear for his or her own health or
safety. The children in both instances were uppermost in the parents' concerns. Yet the
healthy parental fear and concern is, according to the courts' analysis, subrogated to fear for
each parent's own personal safety.
"' Magruder, supra note 19, at 1039.
120 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
Id. at 746-47, 441 P.2d at 924-25, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 84-85.
... Id. at 747, 441 P.2d at 925, Cal. Rptr. at 85.
's' Id. at 741, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
114 See, e.g., Keck v. Jackson, 122 Ariz. 114, 593 P.2d 668 (1979) (daughter witnessed
automobile accident involving her mother); Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104 (Iowa 1981)
(son witnessed peril to mother); Culbert v. Sampson's Supermarkets Inc., 444 A.2d 433 (Me.
1982) (mother became emotionally distressed as result of seeing her infant gag and choke on
a foreign substance contained in jar of baby food); Portee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 417 A.2d 521
(1980) (mother watched her seven-year-old son suffer and die when he became trapped in
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Dillon has been adopted by a minority of jurisdictions. The forecast of
unlimited liability has not been fulfilled. Courts which have adopted the
rationale have dismissed actions which failed to meet the guidelines. A
parent who observed the progressive decline of a child's health as a result
of malpractice was barred from recovery because the event was "continu-
ously unfolding" rather than an immediate assault.12 Similarly, the prox-
imity requirement was not met when a parent learned by telephone of the
negligently caused deaths of a child and grandchild.1 2 Plaintiffs who
have failed to demonstrate evidence corroborative of severe emotional
distress have also been denied a remedy. 127
The evolution of the negligence action has not halted with Dillon. The
courts which have adopted the Dillon reasoning have not felt compelled
to construe strictly the language of "sensory contemporaneous obser-
vance" of the accident.128 Actions have been sustained where the close
relative neither contemporaneously nor perceptually witnessed the actual
negligence, but where the relative was determined to be an active partici-
pant. In Lafferty v. Manhasset Medical Center,1 2 9 the daughter-in-law
who watched and tried to comfort her mother-in-law who was dying from
a mismatched blood transfusion was deemed to be an active participant
in the event.
The courts have also expanded the requirement of "contemporaneous
observation," as demonstrated in Archibald v. Braverman.'2 0 The court
sustained an action even though the mother came upon the scene mo-
ments after the explosion which caused the death of her child. Recovery
has also been allowed when the injury to the victim was so severe that the
an elevator); Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 404 A.2d 672 (1979) (observation of automobile
accident); Landreth v. Reed, 570 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978) (drowning death of in-
fant witnessed by sibling).
122 Owens v. Children's Mem. Hosp., 480 F.2d 465 (8th Cir. 1973).
1 Kelley v. Kokua Sales and Supply, Ltd., 56 Hawaii 204, 532 P.2d 673 (1975).
"s See Hair v. County of Monterey, 45 Cal. App. 3d 538, 119 Cal. Rptr. 639 (1975). See
also Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386 Mass. 540, 437 N.E.2d 171 (1982) (action brought by DES
daughters for emotional distress alleged to have resulted from increased statistical likeli-
hood that they would suffer serious disease in the future; action not recognized absent phys-
ical harm from the emotional distress).
128 See, e.g., Campbell v. Animal Quarantine Station, 63 Hawaii 557, 632 P.2d 1066 (1981)
(negligent mishandling of the family dog by the defendant resulted in the dog's death and
caused the plaintiff severe emotional distress even though the plaintiff neither saw the de-
fendant's negligence nor suffered physical manifestations of the emotional distress).
"10 103 Misc.2d 98, 425 N.Y.S.2d 244 (Sup. Ct. 1980), affd, Lafferty v. Manhasset Med.
Center Hosp., 54 N.Y.2d 277, 429 N.E.2d 789, 445 N.Y.S.2d 111 (1981).
10 275 Cal. App. 2d 253, 79 Cap. Rptr. 723 (1969). See also Dzionkinsky v. Babineau, 375
Mass. 555, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (1978) (adopts reasonably-foreseeable standard and allows re-
covery where the parent either witnessed the accident or soon came on the scene while the
child was still there); Mercado v. Transport of New Jersey, 176 N.J. Super. 134, 422 A.2d
800 (1980) (mother was told of accident and rushed to the scene within minutes to observe
her son in the street severly injured and unconscious).
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shock suffered by the family upon viewing the injuries was considered by
the court to be of greater significance than actual presence at the scene of
the accident.'
The majority rule requires physical manifestation of emotional distress
arising from negligence.3 2 A few jurisdictions have departed from the re-
quirement of physical manifestation of harm. California has modified its
stance in Dillon by allowing recovery to a complainant who had neither
witnessed the negligence between the primary parties nor demonstrated
physical manifestation of his emotional distress.' 3'
In eighty years, the tort as it relates to bystanders has gradually
progressed from a general bar to recovery to a willingness to carve out
exceptions. Only in a minority of jurisdictions does the action rest on gen-
eral principles of negligence.
VI. INTENTIONAL ACTS CAUSING RECKLESS INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL
DISTRESS
Actions in emotional distress generally fall into two categories. The ac-
tion for intentional infliction of emotional distress encompasses two par-
ties; the action for third-party victims falls within the category of negli-
gence. However, a different analysis should be employed when the
defendant intentionally injures a party and in turn recklessly causes emo-
tional distress to the third-party victim.
Garland v. Herrin,"" a civil action instituted by the parents of Bonnie
Garland, was heard in the Federal District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York. The action was brought for the intentional infliction of
emotional distress caused by Herrin's intentional murder of the Garlands'
daughter."15
The Garland matter is distinctive for three reasons: third parties were
claiming intentional infliction of emotional distress when the intentional
act was directed at another; liability was based upon the theory of reck-
lessness as promulgated in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS; and
neither Mr. nor Mrs. Garland was literally present at the time of the
event.
The RESTATEMENT equates recklessness with intentional conduct.
One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or
Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc., 381 Mass. 507, 413 N.E.2d 690 (1980) (hus-
band/father paralyzed below the neck following industrial accident).
132 Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
'3 Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 127 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980)
(plaintiff stated a cause of action for negligent infliction of severe emotional distress by
alleging that defendant negligently diagnosed plaintiff's wife as having syphilis, instructed
wife to advise plaintiff of her diagnosis, and requested plaintiff to submit to a blood test).
554 F. Supp. 308 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 724 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1983).
"s Id. at 309.
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recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to
liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the
other results from it, for such bodily harm." 6
The crux of an action for emotional distress with liability founded upon
recklessness centers on the intent of the actor. Tortious intent has been
found when the actor desires to cause the consequences of his act a7 or
when the actor is substantially certain that the consequences will come
about as a result of his act."3 s While Richard Herrin faced criminal
charges for the murder of Bonnie Garland as both his act and the death
of Bonnie were intended, the criminal law would not prosecute Herrin for
the emotional "assault" upon the parents. Herrin's act is indicative of the
difference between criminal and tortious intent and the consequences of
either intent.
For the civil law to impose liability for invasions of protected interests,
the law imputes to the defendant knowledge of the consequences of his
actions and attaches liability thereto, even if the harm which follows was
unintended.'3 9 In this regard, tort law differs from criminal law. The dis-
tinction between the two is that in tort the probability, or substantial
certainty, that certain consequences will follow from an act is sufficient
for liability; the knowledge of the probability plus the wish for those con-
sequences working as a motive which induces the act are necessary for
conviction of more serious offenses under the criminal law.'40 Thus, the
criminal law requires a concurrence of act and mental state and requires
that the perpetrator, under certain statutorily defined crimes such as
murder, intend the specific consequences of the act. Unlike civil law,
criminal sanctions will not follow where an intended harm towards one
causes a different and unintended harm towards another.'" Therefore,
while the criminal law would punish Herrin's intentional murder of Bon-
nie Garland, it would not in turn hold Herrin criminally responsible for
the "unintended" emotional distress inflicted on her parents. Criminal as-
sault does prosecute defendants for intentionally caused fright. However,
the assault must cause fear of bodily injury. 42 As the Garlands' emotional
distress did not encompass fear for their own safety, criminal assault
charges would not issue against Herrin. The criminal law leaves it to the
civil law to redress the injury.""
136 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1977) (emphasis added).
137 Id. § 8A.
138 See Garratt v. Dailey, 46 Wash. 2d 197, 297 P.2d 1091 (1955), second appeal, 49
Wash. 2d 499, 304 P.2d 681 (1956); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A.
"" W. PROSSER, supra note 51, at 32; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A.
110 O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 53 (1881).
"I W. LAFAV & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW 196 (1972).
... Id. at 603-13.
' Id. The jurisdictions are not in accord regarding the criminal culpability of assault
with intent to frighten.
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The elements required to substantiate intent in the criminal law and in
tort law diverge because of the price society extracts from a perpetrator
of crime, as opposed to that demanded of a civil defendant. The civil
defendant is liable for money damages, while the criminal defendant may
face incarceration or death for the consequences of his act. To ensure his
culpability, the law requires both an "evil mind" and an "evil act.' 44
While tort law does not seek to analyze the defendant's motive, tortious
intent converges with that of criminal law in the sphere of recklessness.
In criminal law "a reckless act may be treated as if it resulted from a
malicious purpose.' 14 The RESTATEMENT places recklessness in the same
category as intent for the purpose of establishing infliction of emotional
distress. It treats the act as if it were intentional because of the substan-
tial certainty that specific consequences will follow. 14
Such a result arises from the nature of the act involved and is justified
on the ground that one who acts outrageously and recklessly with sub-
stantial certainty of the consequences should be held liable to the same
degree as one who acts with purposeful design.147 While recklessness is
theoretically separable from intentional conduct, for purposes of liability
they are held to be equivalent.
Therefore, if an actor proceeds to cause harm either with his own
knowledge or with knowledge legally imputed to him because of the char-
acter of his act, the law will treat him as though he intended the harm. 148
One who fires at another with intent to hit him though he misses is, of course, a
far more dangerous person than his milder counterpart who goes about intending
only to frighten and not to injure .... Therefore, the criminal law properly first
singles out for punishment the man of violence who attempts a battery. Of course,
the person who successfully frightens others, though not so bad a person as the
unsuccessful attacker, is not altogether admirable-so that the view of the major-
ity of the states, which include him in the net comprising the crime of assault, is
not necessarily wrong, though the minority view is to leave such minor bad con-
duct to the civil law to discourage ....
Id. at 612 (citations omitted).
J44 .MARSHALL, INTENTION-IN LAW AND SOCIETY 10 (1968).
'45 Id. at 6.
"16 See FITZGERALD, SALMOND ON JURISPRUDENCE (12th ed. 1966):
A statement much nearer the truth is that the law frequently-though by no
means invariably-treats as intentional all consequences due to that form of negli-
gence which is distinguished as recklessness-all consequences, that is to say,
which the actor foresees as the probable results of his wrongful act.
Id. at 368-69 (emphasis added).
"17 Recklessness may be equivalent to intentional conduct in criminal law, according to
the Model Penal Code, which states that the degree of intent sufficient for criminal homi-
cide includes acting purposely, knowingly, or recklessly under circumstances manifesting
extreme indifference to the value of human life. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 (Proposed Offi-
cial Draft 1962) (emphasis added).
"I O.W. HOLMES, Privilege, Malice, and Intent, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS (1920). "If
the manifest probability of harm is very great, and the harm follows, we say that it is done
maliciously or intentionally; if not so great but still considerable, we say that the harm is
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Where the conduct towards the victim is both intentional and by its na-
ture so reprehensible as to shock the common sensibilities, as in the bru-
tal assault on Bonnie Garland, it may be said that the same act was sub-
stantially certain to have emotional repercussions upon third-party
victims. As substantial certainty supports the theory of recklessness, 4"
and recklessness supports the cause of action for emotional distress as an
equivalent of intentional conduct, '50 third-party victims should be af-
forded a remedy for the reckless misconduct of the defendant towards
themselves.
In the civil action of Garland v. Herrin,'"' the defendant conceded at
trial that his actions constituted "extreme and outrageous conduct."' 5' It
was conceded by the plaintiffs that defendant Herrin had not intended to
cause the parents emotional distress. The parents argued that the defen-
dant's substantially certain knowledge that murdering their daughter
would cause them emotional distress brought the action within the RE-
STATEMENT formulation of recklessness as a basis for imposing liability for
the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.' 3
The federal district court, sitting in diversity, was bound to apply New
York law to the critical facts of the case. Prior to Garland, New York had
recognized intentional infliction of emotional distress15 and negligent in-
fliction of emotional distress.' 55 However, Tobin v. Grossman5  had
barred recovery to a parent in an action in which a negligent driver had
struck the plaintiff's child and thereby negligently caused emotional dis-
tress to the mother. In order to avoid the Tobin rule as to bystanders, the
Garlands had to bring the action within the sphere of intentionally
caused distress. The district court determined that under the New York
done negligently; if there is no apparent danger, we call it mischance." Id. at 117. See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1977).
While an act to be reckless must be intended by the actor, the actor does not
intend to cause the harm which results from it. It is enough that he realizes or,
from facts which he knows, should realize that there is a strong probability that
harm may result, even though he hopes or even expects that his conduct will
prove harmless.
Id. § 500.
"I That substantial certainty supports the theory of recklessness is derived from reading
§ 8A in conjunction with § 500 of the RESTATEMENT.
15* RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1977).
"'. 554 F. Supp. 308 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 724 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1983).
1 2 Id. at 4.
153 Id.
"' Halio v. Laurie, 15 A.D.2d 62, 222 N.Y.S.2d 759 (1961) (communications which the
defendant sent to the plaintiff were intended to cause and did cause the plaintiff severe
emotional distress).
"" Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961) (child was
negligently secured in a chairlift at a ski resort and the plaintiff suffered severe emotional
and neurological disturbances with residual physical manifestations).
'6" 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969).
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precedents,'57 state courts had accepted the RESTATEMENT formulation of
liability for emotional distress intentionally caused. However, the court
cited no opinions where an action had based liability on recklessness.
The court reasoned that the New York Court of Appeals in Fischer v.
Maloney" adopted section 46 as well as the underlying rationale of sub-
stantially certain consequences. Thus, Fischer stated the law of New
York for the tort of infliction of emotional distress and imposed liability
for both intentional and reckless misconduct.
As Herrin's act had been admittedly outrageous and emotional distress
had followed, the court was then faced with the qualifications stated in
section 46(2), wherein the conduct is directed at a third party rather than
the complainant.
[Wihere such conduct is directed at a third person, the actor is
subject to liability if he intentionally or recklessly causes severe
emotional distress (a) to a member of such person's immediate
family who is present at the time, whether or not such distress
results in bodily harm.5'5
The court was then faced with the critical requirement of "present at the
time.' 60 While not bound by the constraints of bystander recovery under
negligence theories, the court recognized the newer boundaries of the neg-
ligence action as evidenced in Archibald v. Braverman,' where recovery
was allowed for a mother's emotional distress when she arrived on the
scene moments after her son had been fatally injured in an explosion.
The mother was not literally present at the time of the event. Her "con-
temporaneous" witnessing of the accident was sustained as sufficient for
the negligent infliction of emotional distress. 6 2
Judge Griesa in Garland also relied on Dean Prosser, who had sug-
gested that literal observation at the scene of the act should not be
required.
As an additional safeguard, it might be required that the plaintiff
be present at the time of the accident or peril, or at least that the
182 Dinger v. Anchor Motor Freight Co., 501 F. Supp. 64 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Fischer v. Ma-
honey, 43 N.Y.2d 553, 373 N.E.2d 1215, 402 N.Y.S.2d 991 (1978).
1- 43 N.Y.2d 553, 373 N.E.2d 1215, 402 N.Y.S.2d 991 (1978). Although the Fischer mat-
ter was dismissed for insufficient pleadings, the Garland court stated that "[tihe necessary
meaning of the Court of Appeals' adoption of § 46 is that recklessness is one ground, under
the law of New York, for imposing liability for infliction of severe emotional distress, when
it is accompanied by extreme and outrageous conduct." 554 F. Supp. at 313. The district
court's reliance on Fischer was misplaced and became the basis for reversal on appeal. 725
F.2d at 18.
119 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(2)(a).
140 554 F. Supp. at 313-14.
... 275 Cal. App. 2d 253, 79 Cal. Rptr. 723 (1969).
" Id. at 256, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 725.
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shock be fairly contemporaneous with it, rather than follow when
the plaintiff is informed of the whole matter at a later date.' 6
Further authority for the proposition that literal presence should not be
required in all circumstances was found in the "Caveat" to section 46.114
Noting specifically that the defendant in this instance had designed the
circumstances to avoid the parents' literal presence on the scene, the
court concluded that judgment should be awarded to the parents for their
claim.
The crime committed by Herrin was carried out against their
daughter in their own home. It was committed at night when they
were present in the home, a few feet away from the scene, al-
though they were asleep at the time. Herrin procured the murder
weapon in their home and has admitted that he was concerned
about being detected by Mr. and Mrs. Garland and thus took
steps to mask what he was doing. He took full advantage of the
helplessness of Bonnie while she was asleep, to commit this act of
incredible savagery. Thus Herrin violated in the worst manner
the sanctity of the Garland home, not only as to Bonnie, but as to
her parents.
16 5
Mr. and Mrs. Garland were nearby at the time of the assault and the
mother became involved in the tragedy the moment the policemen ar-
rived at her doorstep. The whole set of circumstances is remote from the
"typical" third-party-victim action for emotional distress sounding in
negligence. The action toward the first victim was intentional. The unin-
tended harm to the parents was not merely negligent as falling below a
standard of reasonable care, but was rather in reckless disregard of the
parents and by its very nature substantially certain to cause them harm.
Therefore, the strictures that generally bind third-party victims whose
actions sound in negligence were not applied. Requiring physical presence
at the scene of the murder would have produced the anomalous result of
barring the parents from recovery for not literally being present, when,
16 554 F. Supp. at 314.
164 "The institute expresses no opinion as to whether there may not be other circum-
stances under which the actor may be subject to liability for the intentional or reckless
infliction of emotional distress." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1977). As early as
1936, it was suggested in a hypothetical situation which is analogous to Garland that literal
presence in all circumstances should not be required.
Yet from the standpoint of foreseeability of harm through shock, there seems lit-
tle to choose between the case where the plaintiff sees a murderous attack upon
her aged father, and a case where, after the attack, the daughter comes home and
stumbles upon his bloody remains. . . . When a murderer kills his victim, he
knows that an acute shock will inevitably be caused to the near relatives, though
of course he is not acting for that purpose.
Magruder, supra note 19, at 1044-45.
166 554 F. Supp. at 314.
1983-84]
29Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1984
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
had they been present, the murder might not have occurred and corre-
spondingly they would not have been harmed.
Two of the grounds upon which the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed the district court were: 1) New York has not permitted recovery
for emotional distress inflicted recklessly but not intentionally; and
2) New York does not permit a "bystander" to recovery for psychic in-
jury resulting from harm inflicted on another."' As previously dis-
cussed, 167 Tobin v. Grossman168 barred bystanders from the action for
negligently inflicted emotional distress; therefore, the appellate court's
second ground for reversal was accurate, although unnecessary, as the ac-
tion was not brought in negligence. The major point of contention be-
tween the courts arose because of the district court's reading of Fischer v.
Maloney"6 9 as stating that the law of New York encompasses both inten-
tionally and recklessly caused emotional distress. The court of appeals
noted that while the Fischer court referred to RESTATEMENT section 46,
the question of the distinction between reckless and intentional conduct
was not before the court.1"' The court of appeals read Fischer as holding
merely that "bringing an unsuccessful defamation action was not 'conduct
exceeding all bounds usually tolerated by decent society.' 9171
The appellate court was correct in that the district court, in essence,
was asked to write new law. The plaintiffs, aside from reliance on Fischer,
could cite no New York authority for the proposition that a cause of ac-
tion will lie for recklessly caused emotional distress.
The appellate court did recognize that a state court of appeals "might
assess differently the delicate policy considerations if it were presented,
as here, with severe emotional distress recklessly caused by extreme and
outrageous conduct. ' 172 Therefore, the issue as resolved by the appellate
court leaves to the state courts the responsibility of policy-making for fu-
ture emotionally distressed victims. The Garlands themselves have suf-
fered another reversal.
Neither the RESTATEMENT formulation nor the lower court's substantive
analysis was attacked by the appellate court. Therefore, although the
lower court's decision will have no precedential value, the analysis should
merit attention and lead to the further evolution of the common-law ac-
tions for infliction of emotional distress.
Prior to Garland, similar cases were heard under negligence theories
where the defendant, in outrageously assaulting another, had caused emo-
116 724 F.2d at 21.
167 See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969).
43 N.Y.2d 553, 373 N.E.2d 1215, 402 N.Y.S.2d 991 (1978).
170 724 F.2d at 18-19.
171 Id.
"' Id. at 19.
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tional distress to a witnessing third party.1 7 3 In Hill v. Kimball,174
Mrs. Hill "sustained a fright" which ultimately resulted in a miscarriage
after she witnessed the defendant's brutal assault upon two people on her
premises. The court, as early as 1890, recognized that a severe emotional
disturbance could result from the nature of the defendant's act. The
court reasoned that the defendant should be held liable if a "reasonably
prudent man would have anticipated the danger to her."'"5 The existence
of several critical facts would have achieved the same result under a reck-
lessness analysis. The defendant's "willful" assault carried forth with
knowledge that the plaintiff was present and in an advanced state of
pregnancy would have removed the action from a "standard-of-care anal-
ysis" to the realm of reckless misconduct which was substantially certain
to cause the plaintiff severe emotional distress.
A similar result was reached in Watson v. Dilts,'7 6 where a wife suf-
fered severe emotional distress and anxiety as a result of the defendant's
assault upon her husband. While the court recognized the interest in
emotional tranquility, it is unclear whether the court allowed the action
to stand on its own merits or whether the action was merely considered a
parasitic element of damages because of the defendant's trespass upon
the husband's home.
Trespass also was an element in Young v. Western & A.R. Co. 177 In
Young, a railroad agent entered the home of the plaintiff and while point-
ing a pistol at the bed, dragged plaintiff's husband from the bed, causing
the wife severe emotional distress. The action was not for a mere negli-
gent tort, but was for a "positive and willful wrong.' ' 7 8 Both Watson and
Young were heard in the early part of the twentieth century, prior to both
the general recognition of intentional infliction of emotional distress and
to the RESTATEMENT formulation of the basis of the cause of action. Both
cases were tied to trespass actions; however, even in the trespass action,
the court was "stretching" to achieve an equitable result as neither wife
owned the property upon which the individual defendants trespassed.
These early cases were part of the evolving recognition of the action. If
brought in the 1980's both actions would survive the analysis of the dis-
trict court in Garland and the RESTATEMENT. Both involved outrageous,
unprivileged acts by defendants who knew with substantial certainty that
the assaults on the husbands would cause the wives emotional distress.
Unlike Garland, though, the plaintiffs in Young and Watson witnessed
173 See, e.g., Hill v. Kimball, 76 Tex. 210, 13 S.W. 59 (1890).
174 Id.
171 Id. However, unresolved in Hill and in other "miscarriage" cases is the causal, that is,
medical link between emotional distress and miscarriage. More than likely, the miscarriage
was merely the courts' evidentiary crutch to validate the intangible emotional injury.
178 116 Iowa 249, 89 N.W. 1068 (1902).
177 39 Ga. App. 761, 148 S.E. 414 (1929).
178 Id.
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the brutality.
A two-party action in which the court analyzed the "willfulness" of
conduct was Blakeley v. Shortal's Estate.'7 9 Noting that a plaintiff was
barred from recovery for the disturbance of mental tranquility when
caused by a negligent act, the court would not adopt the negligence rule
when it was shown that the plaintiffs' fright was due to a willful act. The
defendant guest of the plaintiffs had committed suicide in the kitchen of
their home while they were away for the day. When the plaintiffs re-
turned, they found the defendant, his throat slit, lying in a pool of blood
on their kitchen floor. While remanding the case to the trial court for a
determination of whether the defendant's actions were willful, the court
indicated that there was sufficient evidence to support the conclusion
that the intentional act of suicide caused the willful injury to the plain-
tiffs. 180 It was not necessary for the defendant to intend the specific harm
to the plaintiffs; it was sufficient that the defendant acted with reckless
disregard of the plaintiffs.181 The court explained that to constitute a
willful injury, the act which produced it must have been intentional, or it
must have been done under such circumstances as evinced a reckless dis-
regard for the safety of others and a willingness to inflict the injury com-
plained of.1 82 The fact that the plaintiffs had failed to witness the actual
suicide did not deter the court. Witnessing the aftermath was sufficient.
Facts more closely analogous to the tragedy in Garland, in that the acts
were intentional and outrageous as to the intended victim, were raised on-
demurrer in Mahnke v. Moore.'83 The child, as plaintiff, brought an ac-
tion against the estate of her deceased father for having murdered her
mother in her presence and then one week later having committed suicide
in her presence. While the court was chiefly concerned with the issue of
parental immunity, it allowed the matter to proceed on the merits under
a negligence theory. 84
Blakeley and Mahnke would both survive scrutiny under the RESTATE-
MENT. In each instance the actions of the defendants were outrageous and
were substantially certain to have caused the victims emotional distress.
While these early cases achieved the same result, the analysis was not
clear. Had Blakeley been analyzed under zone-of-danger negligence rules
as applied to bystanders, the action would have been unsuccessful.
As a general rule, the complaining third party's action is heard in negli-
gence because of the element of "unintended" harm. Because the major-
ity of jurisdictions bar recovery for the "unintended" harm absent the
zone-of-danger requirement, most third-party victims remain
179 236 Iowa 787, 20 N.W.2d 28 (1945).
180 Id. at 791, 20 N.W.2d at 31.
181 Id.
182 Id.
--- 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951).
I Id. at 69, 77 A.2d at 927.
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unrecompensed.
The theory of recklessness in the district court opinion in Garland ex-
pands the scope of intentional infliction of emotional distress to third-
party victims. As the basis of the defendant's liability arose from an in-
tentional tort rather than from negligence, the theory does not rely on the
artificial zones of recovery that have constrained the action and recovery
in negligence. Rather than being constricted by foreseeable-duty analysis
in negligence, the reckless and outrageous nature of the act resulted in an
analysis of act, intent, and causation. Literal presence at the scene of the
incident was not required because of the particular facts and circum-
stances of the tragedy.
Liability for reckless and outrageous behavior to third-party victims
may well be a circumscribed action by its very nature. However, it should
nonetheless be an option available to those third-party victims who have
suffered the wrongful death of a child at the hands of one who was not
merely negligent, but was in reckless disregard of the substantial cer-
tainty of the consequences of his act, both as to the child and the surviv-
ing victims.
The action should not be limited to horrible murder scenes as present
in Garland. It should also be applicable to acts by defendants which fit
into a category where had another tort been present, punitive damages
would have been available because of the wanton and willful character of
the act. 8 " The "easy" cases would be those similar to actions in which
intentional infliction of emotional distress was first recognized, that is, in
those cases where there is already established a special relationship or
duty to the plaintiff. Such an action has been sustained for a death
caused by an outrageous failure to act, in Grimsby v. Samson.8'" In
Grimsby, the defendant hospital and doctors were found liable for "pas-
"' Many bystander actions have been heard under the negligence theory when a negligent
driver has struck a child. See, e.g., Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 72 (1968). However, if the driver were not merely negligent but were recklessly disre-
gardful, the district court's analysis in Garland could be employed. As an example, punitive
damages have been suggested as a deterrent for drunken driving and would be attached to a
common-law action because of the wanton and willful character of the defendant's act. Sim-
ilarly, if a parent suffered severe emotional distress as a result of the wrongful death of a
child arising from the outrageous conduct of a defendant driving while intoxicated, the ac-
tion for the parent who either witnessed the accident or who came upon the scene fairly
contemporaneously should lie under the Garland and RESTATEMENT analyses.
Other actions, outrageous toward the child and correspondingly reckless to the third-
party victim, would lie where a defendant ignored school crossings or school-bus warnings
and struck a child. Similarly, a policeman or fireman who recklessly drove through a neigh-
borhood at a high rate of speed without emergency flashers and siren should be liable both
to the injured child and the emotionally distraught parent. In each instance, the action
should lie if the defendant's conduct was sufficiently wanton and willful to meet the RE-
STATEMENT definition and a parent correspondingly suffered severe emotional distress as a
result of witnessing the actual event or the aftermath as evidenced by the child's injuries.
'" 85 Wash. 2d 52, 530 P.2d 291 (1975).
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sively" outrageous acts in failing to treat the plaintiff's wife. The husband
looked on while his wife "proceeded to die right in front of his eyes." '
While the focus of this Note has been the wrongful deaths of children
and the resulting emotional distress suffered by the surviving parents, the
reckless infliction of emotional distress to third-party victims should not
be confined to actions for wrongful death. A case exemplifying an inten-
tional and outrageous act by the defendant resulting in emotional distress
to the plaintiff was heard by the Supreme Court of Washington in
Schurk v. Christensen.' The court denied recovery for mental distress
suffered by the mother of a five-year-old who was not near the scene of
the child's sexual molestations by a babysitter. The mother was barred
from recovery because she failed to observe the actual sodomization of
her daughter. The majority of the court invoked the "zone of danger"
requirement. The vigorous dissent noted:
It means nothing to consider whether the rape of the daughter
actually invaded the security of the mother. It is meaningless to
talk about the zone of danger of a rape; if the mother had been
present or within the zone of danger, there would have been no
rape. 8 9
Even though the dissent based its opinions on a breach of contract by
the babysitter's mother who had vouched for the reliability of her son,
while having knowledge of his propensities, 190 the facts are analogous to
those in Garland. Unquestionably, the babysitter's conduct was outra-
geous. He clearly designed the circumstances so as to forestall the par-
ent's literal presence on the scene. He furthermore could be charged with
imputed knowledge that once the mother was apprised of the molesta-
tions she would suffer emotional distress. Both the mother and the child
were forced to undergo psychiatric care as a result of the defendant's out-
rageous conduct. Breach of contract aside, the defendant's outrageous
conduct would have made him liable under RESTATEMENT section 46: it
proximately caused harm to both the mother and child and the harm was
substantially certain to result from his reprehensible behavior.
Reckless infliction of emotional distress involving outrageous acts sub-
stantially certain to cause third-party distress is an action involving aber-
rant conduct. Presumptively, parents of children should be allowed to
bring an action if they can substantiate the egregious nature of the defen-
dant's conduct and satisfy the element of causation. Whether or not ac-
tions would be sustained with other family members as plaintiffs would
depend on a determination by the trier of fact as to whether a sufficiently
187 Id. at 53, 530 P.2d at 295 (emphasis omitted).
188 80 Wash. 2d 652, 497 P.2d 937 (1972).
Id. at 665, 497 P.2d at 945 (Finley, J., dissenting).
190 Id. at 666, 497 P.2d at 938.
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close relationship existed between the victim and the relatives to substan-
tiate the alleged emotional distress."'
As with intentional infliction of emotional distress in which the act is
directed at the plaintiff, for third-party victim relief the act will need to
meet the requirements of "outrageous conduct." 192 The plaintiff will cor-
respondingly need to produce evidence of psychic harm. It is impossible
to predict how the courts will react when faced with instances of literal
presence as opposed to functional presence; however, the bright lines do
not have to appear until the facts and circumstances are brought before
the court and examined for causation. 93 That this extension of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress based on recklessness will have to
evolve slowly as cases are brought forward is probably foreordained. How-
ever, it is not clear that the courts must follow the same evolutionary
process as in the recognition of negligent infliction of emotional distress
to third-party victims. Courts with the hindsight value of the whole pro-
gression of bystander recovery are free to reject the artificial restraints
which bound the action in negligence and to determine the scope of the
"' The emotional attachments of siblings should be sufficient to sustain the relationship
requirement. Koontz v. Keller, 52 Ohio App. 265, 3 N.E.2d 694 (1936), was an action in
which the plaintiff's sister was intentionally brutalized by the defendant in an outbuilding
upon the plaintiff's premises. The court refused to allow the action for the plaintiff's emo-
tional distress caused when she came upon her sister's lifeless and brutally beaten body
because the defendant had not directed the assault at the plaintiff.
Under Garland, the Koontz attack was not only clearly outrageous, but also carried out
on the premises of the plaintiff, where the defendant knew or should have known that any
relative discovering the body would suffer severe emotional distress.
However, a better decision, which illustrates that a "relationship" should be required to
limit the action, was Calliari v. Sugar, 280 N.J. Super. 423, 435 A.2d 139 (1980). A husband
and wife who were neither present at the time of the alleged murder nor members of the
family of the victim could not recover for emotional distress after the body of the victim was
found buried in the back yard of the house which they had contracted to purchase. Any
person discovering a body buried on his premises would suffer some form of emotional reac-
tion. However, the relationship of the plaintiffs to the deceased was nonexistent and the act
by the defendant was not designed either intentionally or with substantial certainty to cause
the plaintiffs' emotional distress.
The action should certainly lie for nuclear-family members who can substantiate both the
relationship and causation. To sustain an action for non-nuclear family members, the court
would need to be convinced of a substantial link between the intentionally aggrieved party
and the third-party victim. For example, the fiance of an intentionally injured party might
well meet the requisites of relationship.
1 See supra notes 77-85 and accompanying text.
193 If the defendant's conduct met the element of outrageousness and the parent corre-
spondingly satisfied the requisite severity of emotional distress, then literal presence at the
scene should not be required. While learning of the accident over the telephone would prob-
ably not meet the requirements of emotional impact, the scope of the action would encom-
pass parents who witnessed the aftermath of the defendant's conduct. In determining the
scope of the action and the requirement of literal presence of the complainant, the courts
could use the newer boundaries of the negligence actions as guideposts. See supra notes
128-31 and accompanying text.
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liability to be imposed.
Intentional infliction of emotional distress has progressed to the point
where the majority of jurisdictions allow the psychic harm to stand alone
as compensable.1 9 4 Thus, the harm to third-party victims should not re-
quire the corroborative proof of physical manifestations of emotional dis-
tress which is demanded in the negligence action. As the outrageous con-
duct in the two-party action substantiates psychic harm, so should it
substantiate the harm of the third-party victim. Invariably though, given
the nature of acts termed to be outrageous which have resulted in the
wrongful death of a child, physical manifestations of psychic harm will
probably follow.
VII. PSYCHIC HARM AND THE COURTS-SUMMARY
As noted initially, 95 the courts had grave difficulty merely recognizing
that intangible harms should be able to stand alone as meritorious claims.
Part of the courts' difficulty lies in their inability to define the terms with
which they are dealing. The courts use the generic phrase "emotional dis-
tress" as a catchall for a myriad of emotions triggered by the wrongful
death of a child. Instead of defining the terms, the courts have used
symptoms to describe such elements of emotional distress as grief and
mental anguish. For instance, both "grief' under wrongful-death actions
and "emotional distress" under a common-law action for intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress are used as conclusory terms to include such
symptoms as nausea, vomiting, and insomnia. While courts are not
charged with the job of being amateur psychologists or psychiatrists, the
definition of harms by symptoms leads to confusion.
The difficulty is illustrated in Krouse v. Graham,'96 a California case
brought under both the wrongful-death statute and as an action for negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress. The California wrongful-death stat-
ute precluded recovery for grief and anguish occasioned by the wrongful
death of another.1 97 However, California, in the forefront of the expansion
of recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress, does allow by-
stander, that is, third-party victim, relief for the "emotional distress" oc-
casioned by the "witnessing" of the accident. Relief was afforded in
Krouse even though the plaintiff did not visually witness the accident,
but knew where his wife was, heard the approach of the vehicle driven by
the defendant, and knew immediately upon the crash that his wife had
been struck. The difficulty arose when the court determined that the jury
had awarded damages for the grief and anguish the husband had suffered
as a result of his wife's death.
'" See, e.g., Barnett v. Collection Serv. Co., 214 Iowa 1303, 242 N.W. 25 (1932).
,95 See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
96 19 Cal. 3d 272, 562 P.2d 1022, 137 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1977).
'9 Id. at 67, 562 P.2d at 1026, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 866.
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The problem arose in Krouse partly because of the conflicting testi-
mony by the experts as to whether the gastric problem suffered by the
plaintiff arose from "witnessing" the accident or from his grief at the loss
of his wife. 198 There may well be different emotional onslaughts in the
time extending from the contemporaneous witnessing of the impact to the
beginning of the actual grieving process, but the court failed to recognize
that it was using a generic term in allowing recovery for "emotional dis-
tress" but then limiting recovery to the specific aspect of "witnessing the
accident." 199 The court thereby limited the cause of action to the emo-
tional assault caused solely by the "shock upon the sensibilities" even
though the plaintiff had failed to witness the event visually. If the psychi-
atrists as expert.witnesses have difficulty excising one element of emo-
tional distress from others which have followed in series from a traumatic
event, it is inconceivable that a court can so neatly separate the converg-
ing and coextensive facets of the distress.2 00
Similarly, a third ground for reversal by the Second Circuit in the mat-
ter of Bonnie Garland was that "even if New York law permitted both
. . . [bystander recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress, or
reckless infliction of emotional distress], when the harm causes death, the
plaintiffs' recovery is limited to those pecuniary injuries authorized by
New York's wrongful death statute.20 1 The plaintiffs in Garland brought
two separate causes of action: one for the wrongful death of their daugh-
ter under the wrongful-death statute20 2 and the second for their own emo-
tional distress for the assault upon the child.20 3 Just as the Krouse20 4
plaintiff was caught in the morass of separating emotional harms, the
plaintiffs in Garland at the district court level failed to take exception to
the jury instructions which confused the issues by asking the jury to as-
"' The states which recognize bystander recovery for negligent infliction of emotional
distress generally require substantiation of emotional distress with physical consequences.
See, e.g., Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647, 406 A.2d 300 (1979). However, since the Krouse
decision, California has modified its stance. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
'9 19 Cal. 3d 212, 562 P.2d 1022, 137 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1977).
200 In criticizing the near-surgical division into categories of the elements of emotional
distress encompassed within an action for wrongful death, the court in Wilson v. Lund, 80
Wash. 2d 91, 491 P.2d 1287 (1971), noted:
Definition and application of elements of damage defined in this manner, if possi-
ble at all, is a task for theologians or metaphysical seers of former years-who
could determine, it is reported, how many angels could dance on the point of a
pin. Such metaphysical speculation is, in our judgment, not a habit, failing, or
function of modern, well-trained and experienced psychiatrists or of finders of le-
gal fact.
Id. at 101, 491 P.2d at 1293.
201 724 F.2d at 21.
'o' 554 F. Supp. at 309.
203 Id.
104 19 Cal. 3d 272, 562 P.2d 1022, 137 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1977).
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sess the emotional distress arising from the death of Bonnie. 0 5 As the
court of appeals explained, any damages arising from the wrongful death
are limited by the statute. 0 On appeal the plaintiffs argued that their
personal claim for emotional distress arose from the outrageous assault
upon their daughter and "does not even depend on their daughter's
death. '20 7 However, as the issue was not preserved at the trial level, the
plaintiffs were precluded from raising it on appeal.208
Dillon O9 severly criticized the artificiality of distinguishing a mother's
fear for herself from the fear for her child. Dillon was a step towards
recognizing the problem that all of these assaults converge and flow from
the defendant's act. The effect of Krouse is to force a plaintiff to choose
his cause of action carefully and to pigeonhole exactly which particular
component of his emotional distress arises from which cause of action. He
must put his grief and mental anguish into the statutory action for
wrongful death and must excise from that his trauma from witnessing the
accident. However, whichever cause of action Krouse chose, he would be
barred from recovery for the grief and mental anguish. When an action is
not merely for the wrongful death, that is, when the plaintiff has also
witnessed or been a participant in the tragedy, then to simplify matters
all damages relative to that action should be encompassed within one
action.
In future actions involving outrageous and intentional acts toward pri-
mary victims which recklessly cause emotional distress to surviving loved
ones, the courts will be presented with an opportunity to examine the
theory postulated in the Garland district court opinion based on the RE-
STATEMENT, as well as to take the opportunity to elucidate the protections
afforded. If emotional distress is generically a compensable harm, then
both legislatures and courts should recognize it as such and not try to
separate surgically some harms from others, declaring on the one hand
that "shock" is compensable but "depression" or "grief over the death" is
not. To allow recovery for "shock" at the gore and not to allow recovery
for grief or anguish that flows therefrom is unrealistic and obfuscates the
true cause of the emotional distress: fear for the child and anguish over
the child's injuries and resulting death. The only restriction placed on the
elements that make up the "emotional distress" category of harm should
be the requirement that plaintiff sufficiently demonstrate causation and
proof of the psychic harm. If the plaintiff has demonstrated evidence of
"05 724 F.2d at 20. Special verdicts had been submitted to the jury requesting it to deter-
mine: "What amount of damages do you find that [plaintiffs] sustained as a result of emo-
tional distress following the death of Bonnie Garland?" Id. The jury instructions also lim-
ited the question to the psychic harm from the death of the child. Id.
I06 d.
207 Id.
208 Id.
09 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
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psychic harm, then all of the elements of that harm should be
compensable.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Two major conclusions arise from the analysis of the remedies available
to the third-party victims of the wrongful death of a child. First, the ac-
tion for wrongful death under the statute, after eighty years of evolution,
has generally stagnated under the anachronistic pecuniary-loss rule bar-
ring parents from recourse for their real injuries-their emotional harms.
Second, the common-law actions for intentional and negligent infliction
of emotional distress have developed more rapidly than has the statutory
action. However, in a majority of jurisdictions, parents seeking recovery
for the emotional injuries suffered as a result of the wrongful death of a
child must still exhibit fear for their own lives or limbs. Both remedies in
the majority of jurisdictions fail to recompense third-party victims for ac-
tual psychic injuries. The wrongful-death action continues to demand a
computation of a child's monetary worth; the common-law action de-
mands that the law ignore the parents' emotional trauma resulting from
the child's injury or death in favor of the parents' personal fear.
A mere recitation of the facts in Garland evokes visceral reactions.
However, as a result of the state of the law in New York, the parents of
Bonnie Garland recover only the pecuniary losses arising from their
daughter's death. The wrongful-death statute is limited to pecuniary loss;
the action in negligence lies only for direct wrongs, not for wrongs suf-
fered by bystanders; and finally, under present law no action lies for in-
tentional wrongs recklessly causing emotional distress to the surviving
parents.
The legislatures are charged with the task of rectifying the inequities
presented by wrongful-death statutes. Damages for grief and mental
anguish should be encompassed within the statutes. Most deaths of chil-
dren, wrongfully caused, are not of the outrageous nature of Garland; nor
do the parents normally find themselves within the "zone of danger."
Since most such victims thus remain outside the realm of common-law
recovery, their psychic injuries will remain unredressed until the various
legislatures respond.
Intentional acts causing reckless infliction of emotional distress to
third-party victims will produce only a limited amount of litigation. How-
ever, when faced with facts and circumstances which bring the action
within the RESTATEMENT formula courts should consider the district
court's analysis in Garland. The rationale, resting on long-recognized tort
principles, is sound and should in the future provide relief to parents who
have been barred by the action sounding in negligence.
The recognition by both courts and legislatures that a child's wrongful
death causes severe emotional trauma to surviving parents is long over-
due. The grievous assault upon the sensibilities of parents when wrong-
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fully caused by another should no longer remain unrecompensed. The fic-
tions of the pecuniary-loss rule as applied to children and the "zone of
danger" limitation should be replaced by the reality that the psychic
harm of the loss of the child is the palpable injury.
KATHLEEN KEOGH MILLER
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